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When objects disappear from view, we can still bring them to mind, at least for brief periods of time, because we can represent those
objects in visual short-term memory (VSTM) (Sperling, 1960; Cowan, 2001). A defining characteristic of this representation is that it is
topographic, that is, it preserves a spatial organization based on the original visual percept (Vogel andMachizawa, 2004; Astle et al., 2009;
Kuo et al., 2009). Recent researchhas also shown that features or locations of visual items thatmatch those beingmaintained in conscious
VSTM automatically capture our attention (Awh and Jonides, 2001; Olivers et al., 2006; Soto et al., 2008). But do objects leave some trace
that can guide spatial attention, evenwithout participants intentionally remembering them? Furthermore, could subliminally presented
objects leave a topographically arranged representation that can capture attention? We presented objects either supraliminally or
subliminally and then 1 s later re-presented one of those objects in a new location, as a “probe” shape. As participantsmade an arbitrary
perceptual judgment on the probe shape, their covert spatial attention was drawn to the original location of that shape, regardless of
whether its initial presentation had been supraliminal or subliminal. We demonstrate this with neural and behavioral measures of
memory-driven attentional capture. These findings reveal the existence of a topographically arranged store of “visual” objects, the
content of which is beyond our explicit awareness but which nonetheless guides spatial attention.
Introduction
Typically, visual short-term memory (VSTM) tasks require par-
ticipants to search voluntarily their stored representations. Their
task is usually to decide whether a probe item was part of a pre-
cedingmemory array (Fabiani et al., 2003; Vogel andMachizawa,
2004; Astle et al., 2009; Kuo et al., 2009). VSTM has been shown
to retain a topographic organization (Fabiani et al., 2003; Astle et
al., 2009; Kuo et al., 2009; Luria et al., 2010). Recent experiments
have shown that the voluntary selection of an item frommemory
leads to event-related potentials (ERPs) that are relatively more
negative over posterior scalp contralateral versus ipsilateral to the
original object location between 200 and 300 ms (Fabiani et al.,
2003; Astle et al., 2009; Eimer and Kiss, 2009; Kuo et al., 2009;
Dell’Acqua et al., 2010). The effect resembles the lateralized ERP
differences obtained when participants search for objects in per-
ceptual input, known as the N2pc (Luck and Hillyard, 1994;
Woodman and Luck, 1999), which is thought to reflect spatially
specific biases on visual cortices (Hopf et al., 2004) after target
selection processes in areas such as the posterior parietal cortex
(Fuggetta et al., 2006) and frontal eye fields (Cohen et al., 2009).
In addition to being voluntarily deployed while actively
searching memory, attention can be captured involuntarily by
the contents of VSTM (Awh and Jonides, 2001; Olivers et al.,
2006; Soto et al., 2008). We therefore asked whether, just as vol-
untary selection from VSTM recruits spatial-biasing neural
mechanisms, the involuntary capture of attention by items stored
in VSTM might also elicit an N2pc. We also explored whether
subliminally presented objects leave a topographically organized
trace that cannot be accessed consciously but that can nonethe-
less capture our attention. Across a series of experiments, we
demonstrate that indeed this is the case. To test whether the
contents of a past subliminal display could exert a spatial bias on
attention, we presented participants with a supraliminal or sub-
liminal “memory” array of line shapes and, after 1 s, presented
them with a test probe. On a proportion of trials, the test probe
was one of the original memory array shapes, presented earlier
that trial. Regardless of whether the memory array had been pre-
sented subliminally or supraliminally, when one of the shapes in
the array reappeared as the test probe, participants’ attention was
drawn back to the original location of that shape. This was evi-
denced by a clear neural marker of spatial biasing, the N2pc: a
greater negativity contralateral to the original location of that
shape in both subliminal and supraliminal arrays (experiment 1).
We also observed the direct behavioral consequences of this
memory-driven attentional bias using a dot-probe experiment
(experiment 3).Despite this effect on spatial attention, during the
subliminal condition, participants were unable to recognize con-
sciously the test probe as being one of the memory-array shapes
(experiment 1) and showedno conscious bias as to themost likely
location of the test probe in the previous array (experiment 2).
Materials andMethods
All the experiments described had the same basic trial structure. We
presented a memory array of two items either subliminally (63 ms) or
supraliminally (243 ms), sandwiched between two pattern masks com-
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prising visual noise (70 ms) (see Fig. 1A). After a delay of 800–1200 ms,
a test probe shapewas presented. Participants had to perform a judgment
on this test probe shape.
All shapes were constructed from straight lines, subtended 2° 2° of
visual angle at their highest/widest point, and were positioned along the
outer edge of a diagonal (upper left and lower right or upper right and
lower left) of an invisible 2 2 matrix that subtended2.6° 2.4°. The
pattern masks were constructed by randomly overlaying 15 of these
straight lines, each of 2° in length, over one another. Across all trials, each
array contained two shapes that were either symmetrical or asymmetrical
along the vertical midline, with shapes being drawn from a set of 12.
These stimuli were used for all experiments.
Experiment 1: neural consequences ofmemory-driven attentional capture
on a perceptual judgment task. The electrophysiological recording session
started and concluded with an explicit-memory search task. This was
designed to assess the liminality of the memory-array shapes. Partici-
pants’ (n  13; mean age of 25.1 years; six males) task was to decide
whether the test probe had beenpresent in the originalmemory array.On
half of the trials, the test probe appeared in the memory array. They
respondedwith their right hand,with their index finger corresponding to
“present” and their middle finger corresponding to “absent.” d indexed
participants’ sensitivity to the presence of the test probe in the preceding
memory array.
During an electrophysiological recording session, participants per-
formed 40 blocks of 10 trials. The trial sequencewas identical to that used
in the explicit-memory search task. This time, participants’ task was to
judge the symmetry along the vertical midline of the test probe; this
meant that the task was unrelated to the contents of the memory array.
On two-thirds of trials, the test probe was one of the shapes in the pre-
ceding memory array. These trials contributed to the ERP analyses.
The electroencephalogram was recorded continuously (1000 Hz
analog-to-digital rate; 0.1–300 Hz bandwidth; right-mastoid reference),
subsequently re-referenced to the algebraic average of the right and left
mastoids, and low-pass filtered at 40Hz. Trials contaminated by blinks or
eye movements were removed. Because the task performed on the probe
was entirely irrelevant to the characteristics of the memory array, we did
not discard behavioral errors from the ERP. That is, the purpose of the
ERP comparison was not to explore the mechanisms by which partici-
pants distinguish symmetrical and asymmetrical shapes but rather to test
whether processing of the test probewas influenced, in a spatially specific
way, by having “seen” that item before. We compared waveforms locked
to the onset of the probe item over posterior contralateral versus ipsilat-
eral electrode locations relative to the position of the item in thememory
array that matched the probe. We submitted the mean voltage across the
230–280 ms window to a repeated-measures ANOVA for factors supra-
liminal versus subliminal, contralateral versus ipsilateral hemisphere rel-
ative to the item location in the memory array, and electrode (three
levels, PO7/8, P7/8, and O1/2). The time window was selected on the
basis of previous work examining the N2pc effect (Astle et al., 2009). All
statistical tests were corrected for the potential nonsphericity of EEG
data.
For one-third of trials, the memory array did not contain the test
probe. These trials were used for an additional test of liminality: for half
of these probe-absent trials, the symmetry of the probe shape was con-
gruent with the symmetry of the array items, i.e., the probe and array
shapes were all either symmetrical or asymmetrical. For the other half of
the probe-absent trials, the symmetry of the probe shape was incongru-
ent with the symmetry of thememory array items.Were participants able
to see thememory array shapes, wemight expect their symmetry to prime
participants’ response to the test probe, i.e., we might see a difference
between congruent and incongruent trials.
Experiment 2: location decision task. Although participants might be
unable to recognize consciously the test probe per se, they might none-
theless have had some conscious bias toward which memory array shape
was most likely to have been the test probe. This bias might not be
measured by our previous tests of liminality used in experiment 1 but
might nonetheless drive the electrophysiological effects observed. To
check whether this was the case, 11 of the participants who took part in
experiment 1 also performed a separate experiment in a subsequent ses-
sion. The trial sequence was identical to experiment 1. On each trial, the
test probe was always one of the two memory array shapes, and partici-
pants’ taskwas to decidewhich of the twomemory array shapes wasmost
likely to match the test probe. Participants responded with their left-
hand and right-hand index fingers, depending on whether they thought
the test probe was most likely to have been the left-hand or right-hand
memory-array shape. We used d to establish how sensitive, relative to
chance, participants were at selecting the appropriate location of the test
probe in the preceding memory array. We reasoned that this would give
us the best chance of identifying whether participants had any conscious
bias for which shape was most likely to be the test probe, even if they
could not consciously recognize the test probe shape.
Experiment 3: behavioral effects of memory-driven attentional capture.
There is a limitation to the electrophysiological experiment (experiment
1) deserving consideration: although lateralized electrophysiological bi-
ases have been reliably reproduced when participants engage in atten-
tional selection (Luck and Hillyard, 1994; Woodman and Luck, 1999), it
does not logically follow that, if we observe them, attentional selection
has been engaged.We therefore conducted a follow-up behavioral exper-
iment to test the spatiotopic allocation of attention directly. Thirteen
participants (eight had also participated in experiments 1 and 2) per-
formed a follow-up dot-probe experiment. Trials (300 organized into
blocks of 10) were identical to those in the previous experiment, except
for the addition of the dot probe, presented for 90 ms either 150 or 400
ms after the onset of the test-probe shape. Participants’ task was to re-
spond as to whether a small sectionwasmissing from the right or left side
of the dot, with their right-hand index and middle fingers, respectively.
Thememory array and test probe shapes were essentially irrelevant to the
task the participants were performing. On each trial, one of thememory-
array shapes would appear as the test probe, and the dot was as likely to
appear in the original location of these shapes as in the location previ-
ously occupied by the other array shape. If, when the test probe appears,
participants’ attention is allocated to the original location of the probe-
matching item in the preceding subliminal memory array, then there
should be a behavioral facilitation for subsequent stimuli appearing in
this “attended” location relative to other locations (Fukuda and Vogel,
2009).
Results
Experiment 1: neural consequences of supraliminal
and subliminal memory-driven attentional capture
on a perceptual judgment
Explicit-memory search task
This was conducted before and after the electrophysiological re-
cording session to ensure that the contents of the arrays were not
consciously detectable in the subliminal condition. Participants
judged whether the test probe had been present in the memory
array. When the memory array was presented for only 63 ms,
participants’ performance remained at chance (d 0.13, t(12)
0.895, p 0.388). In contrast, when the memory array was pre-
sented for 243 ms, participants’ memory-based discrimination
was significantly better than chance (d  1.91, t(12) 5.835, p
0.001) (Fig. 1C).
Participants had not developed the ability to see the memory
arrays during the lengthy recording session: at the end, just as at
the start of the recording session, participants were unable to
perceive the contents of the arrays presented for 63 ms above a
chance level (d  0.31, t(12)  1.296, p  0.219) and were
able to do so when the arrays were presented for 243 ms (d 
2.00, t(12) 7.483, p 0.001) (Fig. 1C).
Electrophysiological markers
Having validated themanipulation of liminality, we proceeded to
recording electrical brain activity from the same participants,
using scalp electrodes, while they viewed the same subliminal and
supraliminal stimuli (Fig. 1A). Although the memory array had
been completely irrelevant to task performance, when the test
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probe appeared, we found a reliable main effect of contralateral-
ity between 230 and 280 ms (F(1,12) 10.34, p 0.007). That is,
we observed a negativity contralateral to the original location of
the test probe item in the memory array. This effect did not
interact with electrode or liminality ( p values0.34). Analyses of
simple effects confirmed that, when thememory array was supra-
liminal, we observed the probe-locked N2pc effect (F(1,12) 4.70,
p  0.05) (Fig. 1B, left). Thus, although the N2pc has been ob-
served previously when participants search memory actively
(Kuo et al., 2009), this neural marker also occurs when the con-
tents of memory are irrelevant to the task at hand (Olivers et al.,
2006). Surprisingly, we also observed the N2pc effect when the
arrays were subliminal (F(1,12) 5.03, p 0.04) (Fig. 1B, right).
This suggests that attention was still directed to the original loca-
tion of those probe-matching objects (Luck and Hillyard, 1994;
Woodman and Luck, 1999), even when participants had been
unable to perceive them consciously.
Behavior during the electrophysiological session
Aswas outlined inMaterials andMethods, we incorporated a test
of liminality into the electrophysiological recording. When the
memory array had been supraliminal, congruence between the
symmetry of the shapes in thememory array and in the test probe
facilitated behavioral performance (Fig. 2A); on probe-absent
trials, participants were faster and more accurate to respond to
congruent than to incongruent probes
(411 and 524 ms, respectively, F(1,12) 
34.07, p 0.001; 93 and 62% correct, re-
spectively, F(1,12)  17.72, p  0.001).
That performance was affected to such a
great extent by the congruence of the
memory arrays suggests that participants
were attempting to process the contents of
the arrays and used this information to
speed response selection to the test probe,
resulting in a large number of errors on
incongruent trials. If participants were
able to detect at least part of one shape in
the subliminal condition, we would ex-
pect the same effect. However, in this case,
there was no effect of whether the probe
was congruent or incongruent on either
reaction times (511 and 516 ms, respec-
tively, F(1,12)  0.83, p  0.38) or error
rates (90 and 92%, respectively, F(1,12) 
0.74, p 0.41) (Fig. 2B). The lack of this
behavioral priming effect in the sublimi-
nal condition is strong evidence that par-
ticipants could not detect the contents of
the subliminal arrays during the electro-
physiological recording session.
Experiment 2: location decision task
The electrophysiological effects elicited by
subliminal stimuli in experiment 1 might
have been driven by a conscious bias to-
ward which memory array shape was
most likely to have been the test probe.
This bias might not be measured by our
previous tests of liminality but might
nonetheless drive the N2pc that we ob-
served. We produced a dmeasure of par-
ticipants’ sensitivity to the location of the
test probe within the memory array.
When the array was presented for 243 ms, participants’ d scores
were significantly greater than zero (d  3.96, t(11) 8.358, p
0.001). When the array was presented for 63 ms, participants’ d
scores were not significantly greater than zero (d  0.15, t(11)
1.591, p  0.143). In addition to being unable to identify con-
sciously the subliminal memory array shapes or to categorize
their symmetry along the vertical midline, participants showed
no conscious bias as to themost likely location of a particular test
probe.
Experiment 3: behavioral effects of memory-driven
attentional capture
Having ruled out explanations related to participants consciously
perceiving the items in the subliminal arrays, we assessed the
direct behavioral consequences of the spatial attentional bias we
suggested had driven our electrophysiological findings. We con-
ducted a dot-probe experiment to test the spatiotopic allocation
of attention directly. If participants’ attention was drawn back to
the original location of test probes, then they ought to be faster to
make arbitrary judgments about dot-probes appearing in that
original location relative to a control location (Fukuda and
Vogel, 2009). This was indeed the case. The judgment was signif-
icantly faster when the dot had appeared in the “attended” loca-
tion relative to when it appeared in the “unattended” location
Figure 1. A, Trial order schematic. B, Grand-averaged event-related potentials comparing posterior recordings contralateral
and ipsilateral to the location of the probe-matching item in the memory array, locked to the onset of the test probe. Each
waveform is the average of three electrodes (PO7/8, P7/8, and O1/2). We found a reliable main effect of contralaterality between
230and280ms. Thiswas alsopresent as a simplemaineffect of contralaterality inboth the supraliminal and subliminal conditions.
There was no interaction between contralaterality and liminality or with liminality and electrode. Topographical plots show
contralateral minus ipsilateral voltage in the left hemisphere; the right hemisphere shows themirror of this. C, Participants’ mean
d on the explicit-memory search task, for each duration of thememory array, before and after the electrophysiological recording
session.
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(F(1,12) 11.87, p 0.005). This was un-
affected by the dot-probe onset delay
( p 0.22), and, more importantly, it was
unaffected by whether the memory array
had been supraliminal or subliminal ( p
0.55). There was a significant effect of
matching versus mismatching location in
both the supraliminal (493 vs 510 ms, re-
spectively, F(1,12)  4.95, p  0.046) and
the subliminal condition (505 vs 517 ms,
respectively, F(1,12)  6.50, p  0.025).
There were no significant differences in
accuracy between match and mismatch
trials in either the subliminal (95 vs 96%,
respectively, p 0.579) or the supralimi-
nal condition (95 vs 93%, respectively,
p 0.307).
To validate our manipulation of limi-
nality in this dot-probe experiment, as in
the electrophysiological recording session,
we immediately preceded and followed the
experiment with the forced-choice explicit-
memory search task. Before running the
dot-probe experiment, participants’ perfor-
mance was not significantly better than
chance in the “subliminal” condition (d 
0.16, t(12)0.650,p0.528)butwas in
the “supraliminal” condition (d  1.75,
t(12)  4.744, p  0.001). After the dot-probe experiment, their
performance was still not significantly better than chance when the
arrays were presented for 63 ms (d  0.07, t(12)0.266, p
0.795) but was significantly better than chancewhen the arrays were
presented for 243ms (d  2.16, t(12) 6.937, p 0.001).
Discussion
Recent functional imaging studies have demonstrated that re-
taining simple features of perceptual objects recruits early visual
cortices; decoding the voxel-based activity within visual cortical
areas V1, V2, and V3 can reveal accurately the particular items
being intentionally stored in VSTM (Harrison and Tong, 2009;
Serences et al., 2009). This would support the view that VSTM is
mediated by domain-general control areas, such as posterior pa-
rietal and/or prefrontal cortex, interacting with brain regions in-
volved in the original perception of the items (Passingham and
Sakai, 2004). Consistentwith this view, the contents of VSTMcan
be biased by the top-down allocation of attention, according to a
particular task goal, as indexed by anN2pc (Astle et al., 2009; Kuo
et al., 2009).
The current results demonstrate that the relationship between
this posterior biasing mechanism and the contents of VSTM is
bidirectional: not only do spatial biases influence the contents of
memory, the contents of memory also drive spatial attentional
biases when a match occurs with a currently perceived item. In
both cases, spatial biases appear to modulate the current level of
excitability in neural activity in visual areas, which participate in
the coding of perceptual as well as memory arrays (Kuo et al.,
2009). Surprisingly, even information that is task irrelevant and
that does not have to be stored explicitly leaves a topographically
organized trace that subsequently biases spatial attention. More-
over, the experiments presented here provide compelling evi-
dence that objects stored automatically capture attention to their
original location even when they are not consciously perceived
(experiments 1 and 3). In addition to the electrophysiological
evidence for memory-driven attentional capture elicited by ob-
jects in both supraliminal and subliminal masked arrays, we were
able to measure the direct behavioral consequences of that cap-
ture using a dot-probe technique. This is especially surprising
given that retaining the memory-array objects was in no way
beneficial for performance, and the location of objects in mem-
ory did not predict the location of the upcoming dot; the capture
was entirely automatic.
The dot-probe result also rules out one final alternative expla-
nation for the electrophysiological result that the N2pc effect,
rather than reflecting some spatially specific attentional process,
actually indexes some form of object-based priming (Kristja´ns-
son et al., 2001; Kuo et al., 2009). The task performed on the dot
was completely unrelated to the perceptual match between the
memory-array items and the test probe. That we observed a
behavioral facilitation effect to a novel stimulus appearing in
the same location cannot be imputed to simple perceptual
priming and must instead result from the allocation of spatial
attention. Furthermore, that the memory-based attentional
capture effects survive pattern noise masking and occur over
relatively lengthy intervals would also rule out visual priming
as a likely explanation.
It has been demonstrated recently that incoming stimuli that
participants fail to perceive can nonetheless capture attention
(Ansorge et al., 2009). Here we show that previously presented
stimuli that participants failed to perceive, and therefore unsur-
prisingly failed to recognize subsequently, can also capture spatial
attention. In short, the subliminally presented stimuli leave a
trace that retains the original spatial layout of the memory array
and the particular configuration of lines that constitute each
item. This trace is sufficient to drive spatial attention. However,
the subliminal shapes are not assigned to higher-order categories,
with the traces left by the subliminal memory arrays not affecting
the symmetrical versus asymmetrical judgment on the test probe.
An additional question, then, is what type of storage is responsi-
Figure2. A, Mean accuracy and reaction times taken from the supraliminal condition during the electrophysiological recording
session. B, Mean accuracy and reaction times taken from the subliminal condition during the electrophysiological recording
session.
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ble for this effect? The traditional view of VSTM is of a capacity-
limited, time-limited store. Because this store is topographically
organized, it could be producing the effects that we observed.
However, the traditional view of VSTMusually specifies that only
items that participants intentionally retain are stored (Luria et al.,
2010) and can capture attention (Olivers et al., 2006). It seems
unlikely that our participants were intentionally storing the
items; thememory array objects were essentially irrelevant for the
task performed and, in some cases, were not consciously detect-
able. That said, it has been shown recently that large quantities of
information may be retained in a fragile form of VSTM (Sligte et
al., 2008) and that the existence of these fragile object represen-
tations can be evidenced using alternativemeans of probing “rec-
ognition,” such as retrospective attentional cueing (Griffin and
Nobre, 2003; Landman et al., 2003). The traces reported here are
more robust than those stored in fragile VSTM (Sligte et al.,
2008), because they survive combined forward and backward
pattern masking. Nonetheless, like fragile VSTM, there seems to
exist some form of item retention that cannot be evidenced by
conventional recognition tests but that is nonetheless available.
Our findings imply the existence of a previously undiscovered
quality of VSTM or a parallel unconscious store which is also
topographically organized. Either way, we demonstrate that ob-
jects that participants fail to perceive nonetheless leave a topo-
graphically organized trace and guide attention.
References
Ansorge U, Kiss M, Eimer M (2009) Goal-driven attentional capture by
invisible colors: evidence from event-related potentials. Psychon Bull Rev
16:648–653.
Astle DE, Scerif G, Kuo BC, Nobre AC (2009) Spatial selection of features
within perceived and remembered objects. Front Hum Neurosci 3:6.
Awh E, Jonides J (2001) Overlapping mechanisms of attention and spatial
working memory. Trends Cogn Sci 5:119–126.
Cohen JY, Heitz RP, Schall JD, Woodman GF (2009) On the origin of event-
related potentials indexing covert attentional selection during visual
search. J Neurophysiol 102:2375–2386.
Cowan N (2001) The magical number 4 in short-termmemory: a reconsid-
eration of mental storage capacity. Behav Brain Sci 24:87–114; discussion
114–185.
Dell’Acqua R, Sessa P, Toffanin P, Luria R, Jolicoeur P (2010) Orienting
attention to objects in visual short-term memory. Neuropsychologia
48:419–428.
EimerM,KissM (2010) An electrophysiologicalmeasure of access to represen-
tations in visual workingmemory. Psychophysiology 47:197–200.
Fabiani M, Ho J, Stinard A, Grattona G (2003) Multiple visual memory
phenomena in a memory search task. Psychophysiology 40:472–485.
Fuggetta G, Pavone EF, Walsh V, Kiss M, Eimer M (2006) Cortico-cortical
interactions in spatial attention: a combined ERP/TMS study. J Neuro-
physiol 95:3277–3280.
Fukuda K, Vogel EK (2009) Human variation in overriding attentional cap-
ture. J Neurosci 29:8726–8733.
Griffin IC, Nobre AC (2003) Orienting attention to locations in internal
representations. J Cogn Neurosci 15:1176–1194.
Harrison SA, Tong F (2009) Decoding reveals the contents of visual working
memory in early visual areas. Nature 458:632–635.
Hopf JM, Boelmans K, Schoenfeld MA, Luck SJ, Heinze HJ (2004) Atten-
tion to features precedes attention to locations in visual search: evidence
from electromagnetic brain responses in humans. J Neurosci 24:1822–
1832.
Kristja´nsson A, Mackeben M, Nakayama K (2001) Rapid, object-based
learning in the deployment of transient attention. Perception 30:1375–
1387.
Kuo BC, Rao A, Lepsien J, Nobre AC (2009) Searching for targets within the
spatial layout of visual short-term memory. J Neurosci 29:8032–8038.
Landman R, Spekreijse H, Lamme VA (2003) Large capacity storage of in-
tegrated objects before change blindness. Vision Res 43:149–164.
Luck SJ, Hillyard SA (1994) Spatial filtering during visual search: evidence
from human electrophysiology. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform
20:1000–1014.
Luria R, Sessa P, Gotler A, Jolicœur P, Dell’Acqua R (2010) Visual short-
term memory capacity for simple and complex objects. J Cogn Neurosci
22:496–512.
Olivers CN, Meijer F, Theeuwes J (2006) Feature-based memory-driven at-
tentional capture: visual working memory content affects visual atten-
tion. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 32:1243–1265.
Passingham D, Sakai K (2004) The prefrontal cortex and working memory:
physiology and brain imaging. Curr Opin Neurobiol 14:163–168.
Serences JT, Ester EF, Vogel EK, Awh E (2009) Stimulus-specific delay ac-
tivity in human primary visual cortex. Psychol Sci 20:207–214.
Sligte IG, Scholte HS, Lamme VA (2008) Are there multiple visual short-
term memory stores? PLoS ONE 3:e1699.
Soto D, Hodsoll J, Rotshtein P, Humphreys GW (2008) Automatic guid-
ance of attention from working memory. Trends Cogn Sci 12:342–348.
Sperling G (1960) The information available in brief visual presentations.
Psychol Monogr 74:1–29.
Vogel EK, MachizawaMG (2004) Neural activity predicts individual differ-
ences in visual working memory capacity. Nature 428:748–751.
Woodman GF, Luck SJ (1999) Electrophysiological measurement of rapid
shifts of attention during visual search. Nature 400:867–869.
Astle et al. • Subliminal Objects Capture Spatial Attention J. Neurosci., March 10, 2010 • 30(10):3567–3571 • 3571
